The suspension of the maritime corridor means not only a loss of $2.7–3.3 billion in export revenues in the second half of the year. By autumn, the shortage of storage capacity could reach 7–11 million tonnes. This is no longer merely a logistics issue: it is working capital frozen ahead of the next sowing campaign. That is why the risk extends beyond lower export revenues — it spills over into currency, fiscal, and production risks.
(stable navigation through the ports of Greater Odesa does not resume until the end of 2026, while alternative routes expand gradually)
- corridor capacity: around 6 million tonnes per month, including approximately 4 million tonnes of grain and around 2 million tonnes consisting mainly of metals and iron ore;
- potential capacity of alternative routes: around 4.5 million tonnes per month (the Danube — up to 3 million tonnes, rail — 1–1.5 million tonnes, road transport — 200,000–300,000 tonnes);
- actual figure for the first half of August: 794,000 tonnes of agricultural products transported via alternative routes — around 30% of the required volume;
- foregone export revenues in the second half of the year: $2.7–3.3 billion (the National Bank of Ukraine’s estimate is more conservative, at around $2.5 billion);
- “net” fiscal impact: minus UAH 20–24 billion;
- related costs — infrastructure, insurance, storage, and more expensive logistics: an estimated additional UAH 25–27 billion;
- real GDP growth: approximately 0.9–1.1 percentage points lower;
- storage capacity shortage by autumn: 7–11 million tonnes.
These are scenario-based estimates under conditions of high uncertainty. What matters more than the figures themselves are the channels through which the suspension of maritime exports affects the economy.
The arithmetic appears manageable: 6 million tonnes by sea versus 4.5 million tonnes of potential capacity through the Danube, rail, and road transport. But potential throughput and actual exports are two different things. During the first half of August, alternative routes covered only around one-third of the required agricultural export flow.
For the mining and metals sector, this is critical. A high transport component directly puts pressure on the profitability of metals and iron ore. For grain, the issue is different: physically, the commodity can be stored, but every month of delay consumes the producer’s working capital.
Agricultural export revenues not received today will not necessarily disappear permanently. Grain can be sold later, while changes in global prices may partially compensate for lower volumes. For the economy, however, what matters is not only the final amount, but also when the money arrives.
For businesses, the delay has a separate cost. Until the products are sold, companies do not receive working capital, while they still have to pay wages, service loans, buy fuel, cover storage costs, and prepare for the next production cycle.
The fiscal effect should not be calculated simply as a share of lost export revenues. Exports are subject to a zero VAT rate, meaning that lower exports also result in lower VAT refunds, which partially mitigates the impact.
Over the first seven months of 2026, corporate income tax generated around UAH 193 billion. If a scenario-based decline in the relevant revenues of approximately 10% of the average monthly level is assumed, this channel alone could cost around UAH 16.6 billion over six months. A significant part of the effect will become visible only in early 2027 because of the tax payment calendar.
When it comes to GDP, simply subtracting lost export revenues does not work. Harvested but unexported crops may be recorded as an increase in inventories. Weaker imports partially offset the deterioration in net exports.
Ten million tonnes of unsold products are not simply “grain in storage” in statistical terms. They represent capital needed to purchase seeds, fertilisers, fuel, and other resources for the next season. A logistics problem in the second half of 2026 could therefore become a production problem in 2027.
The balance over the coming months will depend on whether the Danube and railways can consistently handle the increased load. If they can, Ukraine will have an expensive but manageable option: part of the products will be redirected, while another part will be stored and sold after maritime exports resume. If actual throughput proves lower than expected, the effects will begin to reinforce one another: stock accumulation will push down domestic prices, more expensive logistics will reduce profits, and lower profits will mean both lower tax revenues and less working capital.
- First, the priority is not to replace all 6 million tonnes at any cost, but to preserve viable per-tonne economics for the mining and metals sector and prevent farmers from losing the working capital they need for the next sowing campaign.
- Second, the Danube and railways must operate as managed, albeit more expensive, routes rather than as channels for uncontrolled overload. Otherwise, the transport component will erode profitability faster than additional volumes can be exported.
- Third, the focus should not be only on revenues, but also on exporters’ cash-flow gaps — wages, loans, storage, and preparations for the next production cycle. It is precisely this gap that will affect 2027.
Ukraine is not restructuring its logistics for the first time. This time, the key question is not how many millions of tonnes can be diverted away from the sea. What matters far more is the cost of doing so and whether businesses will retain enough resources to produce and export again next year.
